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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL LEASING COMPANY,
A Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

CASE NO. 17267

vs.
MANIVEST CORPORATION,
A Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves an action for alleged conversion on
the part of Manivest Corporation, the Defendant.

Manivest

Corporation is the landlord · of a parcel of land and the
building thereon which was rented to a third party, Peck and
Shaw Fine Cars, Inc .. Peck and Shaw in turn as a tenant leased
certain air conditioning and heating equipment from the Plaintiff
and installed the equipment in and on the building owned by
the Defendant.

Peck and Shaw defaulted on their lease with

the Defendant and vacated the building.

The air conditioning

and heating improvements were left affixed as a part of the
building when Peck and Shaw vacated the building.

.Plaintiff

brings this action to recover the improvements alleging their
nature as personal property.

Defendant defends this action on

the basis of the improvements as real property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-2DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This appeal is taken from a granting of a judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff, the Court deciding in the affirmative
on the issue of the personal property nature of the air conditioning and the heating improvements.

The trial was heard on

Thur.sday, October 15, 1981 in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge presiding.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the lower Court's granting
on a judgment in the amount of $18,000.00 in favor of the
Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF THE' FACTS
In the late summer of 1977, Peck and Shaw Fine Cars, Inc.
had its place of business at 5650 South 900 East in Murray,
Utah.

Peck and Shaw leased those premises from Manivest Corpora-

tion on a fifteen (15) year lease commencing in 1971.

On

October 3, 1977, six (6) years after the commencement of the
lease, Peck and Shaw, desiring to upgrade the building's air
conditioning and heating, leased from the. Plaintiff new equipment
(Record p. 66).

The leased items consisted of eight (8) large

commercial evaporative coolers, their supporting sleeve and
duct work, and a heating CO-RAY-VAC system consisting of multiple
burners

hung along the ce·iling and their supporting pump and

exhaust
systems
pp.for digitization
68, 201,
228).
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-3At the time of the lease, General Leasing Company approached
the landlord, the: Defendant, Manivest Corporation, and requested
that Manivest execute a landlord waiver.

This waiver would

have relinquished any future claim of right Manivest would have
had over the leased property.

However, Manivest refused to

execute the waiver (Record pp. 171,172).
In late January, 1980, Peck and Shaw abandoned the premises
at 5650 South 900 East, Murray, Utah forfeiting its leasehold
with Manivest and also defaulting upon the lease payments due
Plaintiff

fo~

in 1977.

At the time of Peck and Shaw's default, there were

the air conditioning and heating equipment installed

approximately six (6) years left on the landlord-tenant lease
between Defendant, Manivest Corporation, and Peck and Shaw.
After Manivest retook possession and control of the premises,
Plaintiff, General Leasing Company, made demand upon the Defendant
to return the leased equipment and the Defendant refused to do
so (Record p. 163).

The Defendant, Manivest Corporation, has

refused to return the equipment on the basis that the heating
and air conditioning equipment have become fixtures in the
sense that they are integrally related to the value of the real
estate.

In addition, Plaintiff was well aware that respecting

the leasing agreement with Peck and Shaw, Defendant had never
executed a landlord waiver respecting the subject equipment
(Record p. 189).

Furthermore, at all times during the term of

the leasing arrangement between Peck and Shaw and the Plaintiff,
the
lease
could
have
accelerated
byInstitute
Plaintiff,
General
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Leasing, to recover the equipment had General Leasing deemed itself
insecure (Record p. 189).

LAW AND ANALYSIS
POINT I
THE COURT'S AWARDOF DAMAGES OF $18,000.00
ASSln:filS THAT NONE OF THE LEASED EQUIPMENT HAD ASSUMED
THE CHARACTER OF REAL PROPERTY, WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS AN INCORP.ECT APPLICATION OF LAW.
The question which must be asked in this law suit is how much
was the Plaintiff damaged by the alleged conduct of Defendant.
Assuming, for illustration, that in January of 1980 when Peck and
Shaw left behind the leased air conditioning and heating equipment,
that

Defendant upon reassuming control of the building, acceded

to Plaintiff's request and returned everything that Plaintiff
had leased to Peck and Shaw in 1977.
ment have been worth?

What would that used equip-

As to this issue, Plaintiff's expert witness

testified as follows:
"Q

Are-you familiar with the value of used
equipment in this community of this sort
of heating and air conditioning equipment?

A Yes, I am.
Q And do you have an opinion of the value of the
equipment involved in this case if it were taken
away from the building and sold as of December 1980?

A Yes.
Q What would the value of that be taken away from
the building?
A Oh, approximately, I'd say right in the ballpark
of $18,000." (Record p. 209).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-5Therefore, based upon this testimony, the entire value of
all of Plaintiff's used equipment was Eighteen Thousand Dollars
($18,000.00) at the time Plaintiff demanded its return.

The

testimony of Defendant's expert witness amounts to even less.
Defendant's expert testified that the used heating equipment,
once returned to Plaintiff, was worth about Sixty Five Hundred
Dollars ($6,500.00) (Record p. 233).
cooling equipment, the expert gave no
Defendant's expert stated that eight

Regarding the used
testimony on its value.
(8) new detached swamp coolers

were worth Ten Thousand, Four Hundred Dollars ($10,400.00) new
(Record pp. 234, 235, 228).

However, as to their used value,

he stated as follows:
" A On most air conditioning installations that
involved the installation of real property,
involved duct work and water lines and electrical lines, the value of the total job,
the material represents probably a half or
less of the value of the total job, so
therefore the labor to install used equipment
is as much or more as it is to install new
equipment. Wben you look at the total savings
on,a total installed job, used equipment
does not look very attractive. And if it's
over a year old, for instance, you have lost a
manufacturer's warranty on the equipment.
Swamp coolers, air conditioners tend to go
fast. They don't tend to hold up a long time.
If I were a customer and as a customer
advising a customer, I would be very reluctant
to generally advise the installation of a used
cooling system for those reasons in a building."
(Record pp. 228,229).
Furthermore, regarding the duct work and support systems for
the swamp coolers, Plaintiff's expert testified that such had no
value in used equipment.
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"Q Now, why is there such a difference between
the value of the property installed on the
building and the value if you took it away and
sold it?
A Well, the labor, you lose the installed money,
obviously. You would lose quite a bit of materials.

Q What type of materials?
A Duct work, water lines, electrical.
Q

These couldn't be used again?

--

A No. The application, the chances of the application
being the same somewhere else on the equipment would
be one in a million. It would just be worth less.
Then half the time you mess it up trying to save
it, anyway. It's just not worth the time to
monkey with it." (Record p. 210).
Therefore, the most the used equipment could have po_ssibly
been worth to the Plaintiff is Eighteen Thousand Dollars
($18,000.00), and that is assuming the Court believed only
Plaintiff's expert. Therefore, ipso facto, by granting judgment
in favor of thePlaintiff in the amount of Eighteen Thousand
Dollars ($18, 000. 00), the Court decide.d that all of the leased
equipment should have been returned to the Plaintiff and that none
of it had assumed the character of real property.
any part of the leased

prop~rty

Therefore,

shown as a clear matter to be

real property, the value thereof should be

subtracted directly

from the $18,000.00 judgment.
As to this situation, the leased articles should be broken
down into their major categories to determine what portions of
the leased equipment are, as a matter of law, too closely related
to the real estate so as to become "fixtures".
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ANALYSIS OF EACH MAJOR CATEGORY OF THE
LEASED EQUIPMENT ACCORDING TO UTAH LAW
INDICATES TRIAL COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY
APPLY THE LAW OF FIXTURES.
Utah's law concerning an item as a fixture is well laid
out in State Road Commission v. Papanikolas, 19 Utah 2d 153,
427 P.2d 749 (1967).

The three way test applied is stated by

the Court as follows:
"[l) In determining whether or not an item is
a fixture, the courts usually apply the general
three-way test, viz., (1) manner in which the
item is attached or annexed to realty; (2) whether
the item is adaptable to the particular use of
the realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor
to make an item a permanent part of the realty."
(1)

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ITEM IS ATTACHED OR
ANNEXED TO THE REALTY.
The air conditioning system consisted of three (3)

component parts:
1) _The bottom discharge coolers on the roof;
2) The side discharge units for cooling
individual areas; and
3)

The exhaust fan system. (Record pp. 199-201).

These components were attached differently to the building in
question.
The bottom discharge coolers were situated resting on the
roof.

In comparison to the average sized residential swamp

cooler, these were huge.

According to Plaintiff's expert, they

were
upby the
toS.J.six
times
the
capacity
residential
coolers.
Sponsored
Quinney (6)
Law Library.
Funding for
digitization
provided by theof
Institute
of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

In fact, they would require the use of a crane for their
removal, in conjuction with two (2) men (Record p. 200).
The side discharge units were fastened to the side of the
building with several screws, and were often resting on the
otherpreviou~lyinstalled

equipment (Record p. 200, 197).

These units would also require crane assistance for removal
from the real property (Record p. 200).
The exhaust fan system is removable only with considerable
difficulty (Record p. 201).

This is due to the fact that the

exhaust system is actually part of the roof.

Removing the

exhaust fan system is to remove the roof's flashing thereby
leaving a gaping hole where removed (Record p. 201).
Regarding the heating system, it was comprised of burners
hung to beams in the building.

The burners by-product is

carbon monoxide which is sucked away by exhaust pumps (Record
p. 202).
removed

The exhaust exits through roof flashings which if
would also leave holes in the roof.

Furthermore,

along the string of burners, eight to ten inch square holes were
left in the walls to accomodate the passage of the system
(Record p. 204).
From the foregoing, it clearly appears that the attachment
element is significant in each of the distinct categories of
the equipment.

Furthermore, it is clear that removal of the

equipment would cause material injury to the building.

Hence,

attachment in the purely physical sense is sufficient.

However,

the systems ought not only be analyzed as how one thing is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9attached to

another,

but also the attachment issue pertains

to the system as a whole.

For instance, each evaporative cooler

required its own independant duct work, its own hole, and its
own sleeve (Record p. 228).

The duct work was worked into the

building such that to remove the duct work would have materially
damaged the structure proper.

The situation at bar is similar

to the fact situation in the case of State Automobile Mutual
-

Insurance Company vs. E. T. Trautwein, a 1967 Kentucky case.
The Trautwein case deals with air conditioners mounted in wall
openings to cool an apartment building.

The opinion stated as

follows:
"According to this testimony, an opening in the
wall of each apartment was provided for permanent
attachment of a sleeve and an air conditioner was
placed in this sleeve and fastened by screws and a
rubber seal. The air conditioners were intended
to remain permanently fixed in place. They could
not be removed without considerable force and
probable damage to the sleeves and the sleeves
couldnot be removed without serious damage to the
wall. These air conditioners were fixtures and
part of the building insured by the appellant."
414 S.W.- 2d 586 at 588 and 589, -(Ken.,'- 1967)
--

An air conditioning system is, after all, a system.

This

idea of an air conditioning continuum was not lost on the
Kentucky Court.

The Court clearly looked at the removal of the

air conditioners as damaging the sleeves which in turn damage
the duct work.

Damaging duct work is clearly causing material

injury to fixtures in the sense of a building's nature as real
property.

The attachment of integral components to one another

constitutes an entire system that begins with the roof mounted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the air outlets within the building.

If

-10It flies in the face of reason to say that the eight machines on
top of the roof could be disconnected and removed without

any

damage to the value of the system or the value of the realty.
(2)

WERE THE ITEMS ADAPTABLE TO THE PARTICULAR USE
OF THE REALTY?

Peck and Shaw sold cars.

In that business, one cannot

expect customer:; to linger without adequate heating and air conditioning equipment.

In car showrooms heating and air condition-

ing are not only adaptable but absolutely essential.

The Supreme

Court of Ohio, in the case of Holland Furnace Company vs. Trumble
Savings and Loan Company, stated as follows:
"A fixture may be defined as an item of property
which was a chattel, but which has been so affixed
to realty for a combined functional use that it has
become part and parcel of the realty. The combined
functional use must be of such a character as to
indicate to all persons dealing with the realty that
the intention and purpose of the owner of the
chattel to make the combination a permanent attribute
of the realty so as to pass in ownership with it."
19 NE2d 273, Ohio (1939)
The Court continued by referring to a disputed furnance
and stated:
"WC.en installed it certainly became an integral
and necessary part of the whole premises and
ordinarily it would not be taken out or dismantled
until it was worn out by use ... The adaptation of
the chattel to the permanent use and enjoyment of
the freehold; the lack of utility of the premises
if it were severed; and the necessity of replacing
it with another or similar kind if it were removed
all indicate that the second test of a fixture. it
is satisfied in the case of this furnace."
Id at 275
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THE INTENTION OF THE ANNEXOR TO MAKE AN ITEM A
PERMANENT PART OF THE REALTY.

The intent of the annexor (Peck and Shaw) can be gleened
from a number of sources and the surrounding circumstances should
be considered.
"
However, the intention to annex
may be and of ten is inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the
annexation, adaption and usage of the
article." Stockton vs. Tester, 273
SW2d 783 at 787. Mo. (1954).
The following circumstances are persuasive.

The air

conditioning units were installed in October of 1977.

By its

own terms, the lease would have run, barring the default of
Peck and Shaw, for approximately another nine (9) years before
the lease would have been subject to renegotiation by Mani vest~.
It can hardly be doubted that Peck and Shaw, given the expense
and adequacy of the new system, wanted to use it for at least
the remaining nine years of its lease and perhaps longer if a
new lease could be renegotiated.

It is clear that Peck and

Shaw must have desired to use both systems during the entire
tenancy of the leasehold and to maintain it as a permanent
accession thereto.

It is clear from the acts of Peck and Shaw

when the equipment was installed, as annexor they intended
the equipment to remain in place on a permanent basis.

For

instance, roofs are expensive to maintain and repair yet large
holes were cut in the roof and the walls to accomodate the
systems.

It is obvious that Peck and Shaw did not have in mind

only
a byshort
term
and Funding
detachable
usage
for ofthe
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-12units were intended to remain in place until obsolescent so
as to justify the initial installation expense of retrofitting
the building.

In a Massachusettes case entitled General Heat

and Appliance vs. Goodwin, the Court stated:
"The central heating plant of a dwelling house
is not a piece of furniture. Successive tenants
do not bring it with them when they become
occupants, nor take it away with them when they
cease to occupy the building. It remains, and in
the ordinary course of events, performs its
function of heating until it wears out or is
otherwise rendered insufficient or useless. It
relates to the building itself. Its presence
has a distinct relation to the value of the
premises for the purpose of sale or mortgage."
54 NE 2d 676 at 679 (Massachusettes, 1944).
Heating and cooling equipment in and of themselves manifest an
intent of permanency.
Furthermore, the evidence adduced at trial showed the
Defendant required of its tenant that the air conditioning and
heating system be maintained by the tenant.

To this effect,

witness Dobson stated as follows:
"A . I said that we would not sign a waiver,
we would take it for consideration, but
I did not think we would sign the waiver.

Q Fer what reason.
A

Because our tenant had a responsibility to
maintain the equipment that was in the
facility, and it was his responsibility to
do so. I didn't feel that we would sign it
on that basis." (Record p.218).

From the preceding example, the annexor, Peck and Shaw, was of
the intention to have the equipment remain on the premises as a
permanent accession to the leasehold.
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POINT III

IR.THE CASE AT BAR THE LANDLOR.r
SHOULD RETAIN THOSE ITEMS DEEMED
FIXTURES AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.
Regarding the leased equipment in questions, title never
passed from the lessor to the lessee.
title.

The Plaintiff did retain

However, the Plaintiff was well aware that the

equipment was likely to assume the character and posture of fixtures for which the landlord may have an interest.

Were this not

so, Plaintiff would have had no reason to request Defendant to
execute a landlord waiver (Record p. 111).

In light of this

fact, the rule is stated as follows:
"
There is authority that where the ·conditional
seller or chattel mortgagee knows at the time of
the sale or mortgage that the object upon which he
depends for security is intended for permanent
incorporation in and affixation to realty not owned
by his buyer or mortgagor, his rights will ordinarily
be held subservient to those of the owner of the
realty." 35 AM JUR 2d §70 Fixtures
The record is clear that the Plaintiff was well aware of the
''to be installed' nature of the equipment.

If fact, Plaintiff's

employee and district manager, Victoria Schoenfeld, stated as
follows:
"Q

A

Is there any particualar custom in the trade of
General Leasing obtaining landlord's waivers
before installation of equipment?
Well, as general practice we usually do obtain
waivers, but it depends sometimes on each
individual case exactly how we go about to get
one, and when and how.

Q Are you saying then that sometimes you don't
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A Well, I guess.about the last year it's been
mandatory. Now we do it as a regular practice.
We did before, but we sometimes made exceptions,
due to a person's reputation or credit file.
We would sometimes perhaps not be as aggressive
all the way through it.
Q

Did you attempt to get a waiver from Manivest
in this case?

A Yes, sir, we did.

Q About when, do you recall?
A At the inception of the lease.
Q

Before installation?

A Well, we told Mr. Peck that we would not give
him the money unless we had a waiver, because
this was going to be installed, and when the
eguipment is installed we get a little
nervous and make sure they know when it is
going in that we have to have this document."
(Record p. 170). (emphasis ours)
From this and from the nature of the property itself, it
is clear that Plaintiff knew of the intended use of the equipment.
Furthermore, the record gives no indication that Defendant was
given any notice by the Plaintiff that the equipment was going
to be installed.

The record seems to indicate the equipment was

installed first--then when the· lease began, Manivest was approached
for a landlord waiver (Record p. 170).
"
Where personality, such as machinery, is to
the seller's knowledge sold to be attached to
the realty of a third person other than the buyer
and used for a particular purpose, in order to bind
such third person by a contract of conditional sale
between the buyer and seller, such as one reserving
title in the seller until full payment, such third
person must have the actual notice of the reserved
title, and its rights are not affected by the
contract for payment between the buyer and seller
without
such
notice."
ma.,..'"'
.. ,.,,..___
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-15Common sense also plays a role in the determination of
fixture cases.

l\Then items of personal property. become too

related to the value of the building that removal constitutes
material injury, they are and should be fixtures.

Regarding the

damage which would occur to the building should the heating
equipment and air conditioners be removed, one must reason as
did a New Yersey Court in the case of Ltnnpkin vs. Holland
Furnace Company:
"A heating plant in a dwelling house
in this climate is as essential as doors
and windows. While the latter may be
removed from their hinges without doing
material injury to the remainder of the
building, in a purely physical sense, yet
depriving a dwelling of all means of
excluding cold on the one hand and providing warmth on the other, cannot be
contemplated without recognizing
material injury as a result." 178
at 789-790 New Jersey (1935).
A 788
Material injury to the freehold is and must be an overiding
concern--even though the subject property is leased and title
thereto is in the. hands of another.

This is the conclusion

of a growing number of Courts in various jurisdictions.
" Another point raised by the appellant's
is that the testimony of Robert L. Tester,
one of the defendants, regarding the
agreement with the tenant that certain
property should remain with the building,
was so contradictory that it had no probative
value.
We think the testimony of Tester in respect
to such claimed agreement was not and is not
the determining factor on the question as to
whether the articles had been annexed to and
become a part of the freehold. The elements
in making such detennination are usually said
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-16As between landlord and tenant and where
the rights of third parties do not intervene,
the intent is of p~ramount · importance. But
as between the owner of the building and
creditors of the lessee it is of only
coincidental importance and the question must
be determined with more emphasis on the
character of annexation and the uses to
which the property is put.
Stockton v.
Tester, 273 SW2d 783 at 786,787 Mo. (1954).
Furthermore, in this case the lease had already been terminated
with Peck and Shaw and Manivest had retaken control.

In that

regard, Plaintiff's right to retake the equipment had also been
lost.
"It is evident that there are circumstances
under which the rights of the landlord will prevail as against a conditional seller or chattel
mortgagee, principally where removal of the
disputed object would result in material injury
to the freehold, but also where the chattel was
mortgaged after its annexation to the realty.
It would also appear to be the rule that if the
tenant, by reason either of nonpayment of rent or
termination of the tenancy, or for other causes,
loses the right to remove the fixtures in
question, such right will also be lost to his
conditional seller or chattel mortgagee."
35 AM JUR 2d Fixtures § 69.
In this

wise~

since the Plaintiff proceeded ahead without

timely prior notice to Defendant and installed equipment on a
long term lease with Peck and Shaw --their right to the equipment
after the Peck and Shaw abandonment-- is no better than Peck and
Shaw's would have been after abandonment.

This point is well

settled.
" Respondent asserts, and we think correctly,
that the chattel mortgagee can get no greater
rights than those possessed by the tenantmortgagor. The ·rule was well expressed in
Donahue v. Hardman Estate, 91 Wash. 125, 157
P. 478, at page 480, 'A mortgagee from a tenant
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-17has no greater right to remove trade fixtures
from the premises after the tenant has surrendered
possession to the landlord than the tenant
himself would have. Whatever right or title
the mortgagee from the tenant may have cannot
rise higher than its source, and is measured
by what the rights of the tenant would be at the
time the mortgagee asserts his claim.' To the
same effect are: Couch v. Scandinavian-American
Bank, 103 Or.48, 197 P. 284, ... (other remaining
cites deleted).
Appellants assert that the rule in California
is otherwise and that the lien of a chattel mortage
is superior to the landowner's title even though
the tenant-.mortgagor may have forfeited' his right
of removal by failure to exercise it within a
reasonable time. They rely however on cases where
the lien attached before the article was affixed
to the realty. The distinction is clearly pointed
out in Martyn v. Hamilton, 62 N.D. 445, 244 N.W. 15,
17: 'A mortgage taken with knowledge of the
landlord's rights and that the machinery involved
is a fixture is entirely different from a case
where the landlord permitted mortgaged machinery
to be affixed to his building.'" United Pacific
Insurance Co. v. Gann, 276 P.2d 858 at 861, Cal.
(1954). See also Glaser v. North, 201 Or 118,
266 P.2d 680.
Since Plaintiff was asleep at the switch when it could have
accelerated its lease with the lessee, and allowed the Peck and
Shaw abandonment ,without procuring their property, they find
themselves in the difficult position of trying to assert a right
they do not have.

CONCLUSION
·The parties'· actions ·and the legal consequences indicate that
G'eneral,Leasing 'Company· has nO cause of
indicates the· following:

(1)

action~

The record

General Leasing Company allowed

a. permanently-installed air conditioning system and heating system
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. -18be installed without notice to or waiver from the Defendant,
Manivest Corporation; (2)

the air conditioning and heating

system together with its duct work constituted an entire system
which should not be broken up due to the continuum nature of
the fixtures; and (3) the property was sufficiently attached,
intended, and adapted as fixture.

Furthermore, none of the

subject equipment can be removed without material injury to the
realty.
Therefore, the judgment as entered should be vacated and
Plaintiff's claims as to the subject equipment should be found
lacking as a matter of law.

DATED this

9'th day of July, 1982.
MORGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS
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